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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

-vRICHARD A.

RICCI,
Defendant-Appellant.

.
.•
.
.
.

Case No. 18165

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with committing the crime of
Burglary of a Non-dwelling in violation of Utah Code Ann., §
76-6-202.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried before a jury which found him
guilty of Burglary of a Non-dwelling on November 17, 1981 in
the District Court 1n and for Carbon County, the Honorable
Boyd Bunnell presiding.

The court pronounced judgment at that

time and sentenced appellant to imprisonment for a term not to
exceed five years.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming
the judgment and sentence rendered at the trial.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

Appellant was charged with burglarizing a bar named
the BEJO on October 11, 1981, at approximately 4:00 a.rn.
Although appellant was a patron of the bar during
the evening of October 10 (T. 80), the barmaid saw him at a
pay telephone booth outside the bar after she had closed,
locked up and left for the night (T. 82, 85).
The next morning at about 4:00 a.m., a police
officer discovered appellant walking out of the rear door of
the BEJO (T. 26).

Other officers arrived and entered the bar

with the appellant (T. 45).

Since the doqr was jammed, the

officer had to enter sideways (T. 45).

As he did so, he

kicked the broken back door lock which was on the ground {T.
46, 47).

At that time the only illumination was from the

clock lights on the bar because the main lights were off (T.
49).

The officer looked toward the front of the bar and saw

that the front of the cigarette machine had been removed (T.
48).
The officers also entered the bar and appellant
stated "I guess I'm in trouble now"

(T. 28).

An officer read

the Miranda warnings (T. 28) to appellant, frisked him (T.
28), and seated him in the bar (T. 30).

The officer found a

knife in appellant's sock {T. 27) and a screwdriver without a
handle in his pocket (T.

28).

-2-
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An officer summoned the bar owner (T. 60).

Upon

arrival, the owner asked appellant "Why did you do this to
me?"

(T •

61) •

He replied "I don't know.

I'm sorry.

everything you own is in this trashcan" {T. 62).

But

Prior to

appellant's statement, the officers had not discussed the
contents of the trashcan in his presence (T. 73).
The juke box (T. 48), change machine (T. 51) and
safe (T.

49, 25) had been broken into.

As the officers

prepared to take fingerprints from the machines, appellant
stated "It won't do you no good.

You won't get any."

The officer who searched appellant (T. 28, 29)
placed the knife and screwdriver in the evidence room at the
police department (T. 29).

Contrary to the inference made in

appellant's brief, the officer also made an inventory of the
trashcan's contents and placed the can and its contents in the
evidence room (T. 31, 32).

The officer locked those items

·)

wi•th

__ 1s
h'

own personal lock and key (T. 32).

The inventory of

the can's contents included over $250 in coins (T. 32), a claw
hammer (T. 31), and food

(T. 34).

The inventory list was

received as evidence at trial, without objection {T. 33, 34).
The court also admitted the can's contents into
evidence at trial after a police officer testified that the
contents were the same (T. 34) as those he found, sealed and
marked as evidence.

-3-
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After appellant was taken to the police station,
Officer Semken advised him of his rights (T. 89) and asked him
if he understood them (T. 90).

(T. 90).

The appellant said that he did

Then the officer asked appellant "What happened over

in Helper?"

The appellant answered "I got caught."

He

further stated that he had hidden in the bar after closing,
had seen the officer making door checks and so had locked the
bar's rear door and then emerged from the bar after the
officer had continued down the alley (T. 90, 91).
However, this testimony was controverted at trial
when appellant testified he had merely entered the bar in
search of a drink in the early morning because he thought the
bar was open (T. 104).

Also, the barmaid had testified that

she saw appellant outside the bar after she had locked up and
left (T. 82, 85).

She also testified that it would have been

impossible for appellant to hide in the location he had
claimed earlier

1T.

95).

Appellant was convicted of another burglary, a
felony,

in 1973 (T. 110, 115).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO AMEND THE
INFORMATION.
Appellant contends in Point II of his brief that the

amendment to the information prejudiced his substantial
rights.
-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Utah Code Ann.,

§

77-35-4(b) provides that an

information can charge an offense by its common law name,
s ta tu tory name, or by definition.

Under any of the three

methods, the purpose remains the same:
sufficient notice of the charge.

to give the defendant

In this case, the charge was

Burglary of a Non-dwelling, an offense which can be committed
by two methods.

When a defendant requires further details to

defend a charge, he or she should file a Bill of Particulars
as set forth in Utah Code Ann.,§ 77-35-4(3).

In this case,

appellant was charged by statute name (R. 1).

If he was

unsure as to whether both methods were included in the charge,
he should have filed a Bill of Particulars.

State v. Martin,

463 P.2d 63 (Ariz. 1970); State v. Wilson, Utah, 642 P.2d 394
(1982).

However, since an offense can be charged merely by

statutory name, the original information was adequate to give
appellant notice of the charge sufficient to prepare his
defense.
Utah Code Ann.,

§

77-35-4 permits an information to

be amended if no additional or different offense is charged
and the defendant's substantial rights are not prejudiced.
/

this case, the amendment did not charge· an additional or
different offense.
dwelling.

The charge remained Burglary of a Non-

The amendment merely pertained to the methods of

committing the crime and was not a change in the offense
itself.
-5-
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In

Appellant contends that his substantial rights were
prejudiced.

For the amendment to be prejudicial, however, it

must alter defenses, evidence, or the potential sentence.
People v. White, 176 N.W.2d 723 (Mich. 1970); State v. Smith,
594 P.2d 218 (Kan. 1979).

In State v. Rohletter, 108 Utah

452, 160 P.2d 963 {1945) the Court found that defendant's
rights were prejudiced when an information charging rape was
amended to include a different offense, carnal knowledge.

The

amendment in that case was prejudicial because the defense of
consent to the rape charge was unavailable to defend the
carnal knowledge charge.
In the present case, as distinguished from
Rohletter, supra, the same defense is available to both the
original and amended informations.

Appellant's defense is

that he allegedly thought the bar was open and entered as a
potential

patron~(T.

104).

When he realized the bar was not

open, he allegedly planned to leave.

Before doing so,

however, he stuck his head out the door and saw a police
officer (T. 107).
Appellant's testimony, if

believ~d

by the jury,

would have been a defense to the amended information as well
as to the original information.

If appellant had entered

believing the bar was open and had left when he realized the
bar was closed, he could not have been guilty of u,lawfully
-6-
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remaining in the bar.

Thus, h.is defense,

if believed, was

applicable to both the original and amended informations.
The evidence presented was also applicable to both
informations.

The knife and screwdriver fauna in appellant's

possession (T. 28, 29), the concentration of coins into one
place (T.

28), and the fact it was about 4:00 a.m.

(T. 26, 27)

indicate that appellant did not lawfully enter the bar.

Even

if appellant had entered the bar believing it was open, those
facts also indicate appellant did not lawfully remain in the
bar.

It is unlikely that another party would have burglarized

the bar and left the money behind.

Appellant indicated to the

bar owner that he knew what the can contained (T. 61),
although none of the officers had mentioned the contents in
his ·presence (T. 72)
is in this trash can"

(Appellant stated "But everything you own
(T.

61)).

Thus, the very evidence that

shows appellant entered the bar unlawfully with the intent to
commit a theft also shows appellant did not lawfully remain in
the bar.

State v. Lamb, 530 P.2d 20 (Kan. 1974); State v.

White, 608 S.W.2d 134 (Mo. App. 1980).
In addition to the same defense and evidence, the
/

potential sentence does not change for .either entering or
remaining with intent to commit a theft.
Appellant fails to show how his reliance on the
original information for notice was crucial to his defense
since he actually raised the issue of remaining unlawfully.
-7-
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In cross examining a police officer, appellant's counsel asked
"Isn't it true, Mr. Atwood, that Mr. Ricci, at the time you
were rattling the doors, came to the door after you had
rattled it? 11

(T. 38).

Appellant's question raises the

possibility that he remained unlawfully in the bar until an
officer came to the back door rather than attempting to leave
as soon as he saw that the bar had been burglarized.
Although Officer Semken testified that appellant
confessed to hiding in the bar at closing time (T. 90, 93),
appellant's counsel had questioned the barmaid and established
that she saw appellant outside the bar as she left (T. 85).
Thus it is clear that appellant was aware that the charge of
Burglary of a Non-dwelling included "entering or remaining in"
with intent to commit a theft.
In State v. Warfield, 507 S.W.2d 428 (Mo. App.
1974), the information charged stealing without the owner's
consent (defendant exchanged rolls of coins containing washers
and slugs for dollars).

On the day of the trial, the state

amended the information to allege stealing by deceit.

The

Missouri court thought defendant's substantial rights were not
/

prejudiced because the statute merely

p~ovided

two methods for

stealing, either without the owner's consent or by means of
deceit.

The offense remained the same.

In the present case,

entering or remaining are the two methods provided in the
statute for Burglary, but the offense remains the same.

-8-
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The Arizona court, in State v. Williams, 499 P.2d
97, 102 (Ariz. 1972), fashioned a different test:

"ask

whether an acquittal as to the amended charge would be a
defense to the original."

In the present case,

if appellant

had been acquitted on the amended information, he obviously
had a valid defense to the original information.
Respondent contends that the amendment did not
prejudice appellant's substantial rights because the same
offense was charged, the same defense and evidence pertained,
and by appellant's counsel's questions at trial, it was clear
that appellant was aware of the charge and the two methods of
committing it.
Even if the trial court should not have allowed the
amendment to the information, the amendment was harmless
error.

The information was sufficient in charging the crime

by name alone.

The amendment may have been unnecessary but

did not result in error.

State v. Crawford, 60 Utah 6, 206 P.

717 (1922).
Although appellant initially confessed and claimed
to have hidden in the bar, this testimony was not supported by
/

the facts.

Appellant claimed he saw the police coming and

locked the door before the officer checked it (T.

90).

This

was clearly impossible since the lock was broken and on the
ground (T. 52).

The officer testified he did not check the

door, but rather saw appellant before he even reached the
-9-
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door (T. 26).

The barmaid testified she saw appellant outside

the bar after she left (T. 82).

Further, the bar had been

broken into, and the burglary proceeds were still there (T.
32).

Thus, even if the trial court errea in allowing the

state to amend the information, the amendment was harmless
error because appellant's confession raisea no real "remaining
in" issue.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN GIVING JURY
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 4.

In Point III of his brief, appellant claims jury
instruction 4 should not have been given because it included
the "or remaining in" language.

Jury instruction 4 states the

statutory requirements of Burglary of a Non-dwelling:
Before you can convict the defendant
of burglary, as charged in the
Information, you must find beyond a
reasonable doubt the following elements:
1. That the defendant, on or about
October 11, 1981, unlawfully entered or
remained in a building of another.
2. That at the time of such entry or
unlawfully remaining he had the intent to
commit a theft.
If you believe that the evidence
establishes each of these essential
elements of the oifense of burglary beyond
a reasonable doubt it is your duty to
convict the defendant of the crime of
burglary as stated in the Information.
-10-
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If the evidence has failed to
establish beyond a reasonable doubt one or
more of the said elements, then you should
find the defendant not guilty of the crime
of burglary as charged in the Information.
This instruction differed from appellant's requested
version in that the court added the "or remaine<l in" language.
Utah Code Ann., § 77-35-30(b) provides that "errors in the
record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by
the court at any time • .

•

"

The court corrected appellant's

requested instruction to include both unlawful entry or
remaining because both methods are included in the definition
of Burglary.
This instruction did not prejudice appellant's
substantial rights for the same reasons delineated in Point I
above.

In addition, this Court has held that it is not error

to instruct according to statutory terms when the evidence (as
discussed in Point I

in this case) justifies the instruction.

State v. Minnish, Utah, 560 P.2d 340 (1977); State v. Starks,
Utah ,

6 2 7 P • 2 d 8 8 ( 1 9 81 ) •

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO GIVE
APPELLANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NUMBER
4.
/

utah Code Ann.,

§

76-6-202 (1953) defines the crime

of Burglary as unlawfully entering or remaining in a building
-11-
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or portion of a building with intent to commit a felony,
or assault.

theft

Utah Code Ann.,§ 76-6-201 defines when a person

enters or remains unlawfully as "when the premises or any
portion thereof at the time of entry or remaining are not open
to the public.

•

•

•

"

Appellant contends in Point I of his brief that his
version of what "open to the public'' means should have been
given as an instruction to the jury.

Appellant's requested

instruction is not the law in Utah ana therefore should not
have been given.
1973).

State v. Richardson, 511 P.2d 263 (Idaho

The Utah Legislature, in setting forth the

requirements for burglary, merely stated that the building not
be open to the public.

Respondent contends that basing the

lawfulness of an entry on the defendant's subjective belief as
to whether a building is open would effectively repeal the
burglary statute.

Very few defendants would admit that they

believed that a building was closed to the public, and proof
of such through other evidence would be almost impossible.
To prove an unlawful entry or remaining, respondent
must only show that the premises were not open to the public,
and that appellant did not have consent or a license from the
owner.
In Commonwealth v. Cost, 362 A.2d 1027 (Penn. 1976),
the court, using a burglary statute similar to Utah's,
required that the state prove the premises were not open to

-12-
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the public.

The state did not .have to prove defendant could

not have thought the premises were open to the public.

In the

present case the state has met its burden of showing the bar
was not open since the barmaid testified she had closed the
bar ( T. 83) •
While appellant was entitled to present his theory
of the case to the jury,

there was no basis in the evidence to

support the requested jury instruction in this case.
several Utah cases with somewhat similar facts,

In

the defendant

was denied a proposed jury instruction on his "theory of the
case" because it was not supported by any substantial
evidence.

State v. Castillo, 23 Utah 2d 70, 457 P.2d 618

(1969); State v. Dock, Utah, 585 P.2d 56 (1978); State v.

Brown, Utah, 607 P.2d 261 (1980); State v. Asav, Utah, 631
P.2d 861 (1981).

This Court did not focus on the defendant's

subjective belief of reasonableness in these cases, but rather
·i

looked at the evidence and concluded it was too slight to
raise a reasonable doubt.
In the present case, the evidence is also too slight
to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether appellant could
/

believe the bar was open.

Appellant did

door, which would be the normal entrance.

~ot

use the front

Instead, he entered

through the back door, located in a dark alley (T. 26).

The

rear door wouldn't open properly but rather was jammed open to
a point that the police officer could only enter sideways
-13-
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(T. 45).

As the officer entered, he kicked the door lock

which was on the floor (T. 46, 47).
main lights were off (T. 84).
bar clock lights (T. 84).

The bar was dark; the

The only lights on were tiny

When one officer entered, he looked

to the front of the bar and could immediately see that a
machine had been broken into (T. 48).
4:00 a.m.
open.

It was approximately

(T. 26), a time when no business in Helper would be

There was no normal activity, no employees or patrons,

and no noise in the bar which could lead appellant to think
the bar was open.
theory.

These facts clearly refute appellant's

Perhaps if he had entered through a front door the

story might appear to be more believable, but in viewing the
facts in their totality, no evidence supports the requested
Jury instruction.
In Commonweal.th v. Tilman, 417 A.2d 717 (Penn.
1979), the-court decided that a car dealership was open to the
public because the state had failed to show that the
dealership was not open.

The defendant was seen in the

building fifteen minutes before opening time, the building was
not shown to be locked, the lights were on, and an employee
even thought defendant was a customer.
In the present case, the time was not near opening
or closing, the lights were off, the door could only be
partially opened, and no employees were present.

Thus,

respondent contends no reasonable person could have found
-14-
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that the bar was open.
fanciful,
theory.

When a .story such as appellant's is so

it does not warrant a jury instruction on his
State v. McCarthy, 25 Utah 2d 425, 483 P.2d 890

(1971); People v. Truesdale, 546 P.2d 494 (Colo. 1976); State
v. Dock, supra.
In State v. Vasquez, 492 P.2d 1005 (N.M. 1971), the
court refused to ·give the defendant's requested jury
instruction on excusable killing because the evidence did not
support a theory of accident or provocation.

The court felt

that the instruction injected a false issue into the case.
Respondent contends that in the present case, appellant's
requested instruction would also inject a false issue into the
case.

If the jury

h~d

believed appellant's testimony,

it

would have acquitted him because he lacked the requisite
intent to commit burglary.

Since his testimony was not

believed, and he entered the bar when it was not open, the
jury correctly convicted appellant.

Since the evidence

overwhelmingly pointed to the fact the bar was closed, such an
instruction was unmerited.
Appellant cites State v. Taylor, 522 P.2d 499
/

{Oregon 1974), for the proposition that whether a person could
think a building is open to the public is a Jury question.

In

Taylor, the reasonableness of defendant's belief was a much
closer factual question.

That case involved a laundry room in

an apartment complex, which conceivably could be open all the
-15-
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time so that tenants could do laundry.

The present case

involves a business entity with clearly defined hours {T. 64}.
In the Taylor case, the defendant would not necessarily expect
any activity in the laundromat--the room would be quiet and
deserted unless someone happened to be using the machines.

In

this case, any patron of a bar would expect some activity,
noise, employees and customers whenever he entered.
In the Taylor case, the lights shown outside the
laundry room, the defendant used the normal entrance and there
was no sign outside the facility limiting the room to tenants
only at specific times.

Thus defendant's testimony was more

plausible and warranted a jury instruction on his theory.

In

this case there were no lights on outside the bar, the
appellant did not use the normal entrance and the business
normally closed at 1:00 a.m.

Therefore, no jury-=instruct-ion

was warranted on appellant's theory.
Even if the instruction should have been given,
respondent contends that the error was harmless for three
reasons.

First, the

bu~gl2ry

statute, the terms cf which were

set forth in instruction number 4, is not unclear.
Instruct ion nurnbe r 5 def in es unlawful ent.r-y as occurring when
the building is not open to the public.

Appellant claims that

if the jury is not instructed on reasonable belief as to
whether a building is open, "any entry, regardless of the
aJpearance of the business, is unlawful if the management
-16-
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had intended that it be closed."

While the Utah Legislature

did not define "open to the public," the phrase is clear and
easy to interpret under each fact situation.

Whether a

building is open depends on the extrinsic facts

(i.e.,

unlocked, lights on, close to opening time), not on either
defendant's or management's subjective belief.
Second, the jury instructions, taken as a whole,
require the jury to consider all the evidence, including
defendant's testimony.
testimony,

Thus, if the jury believed appellant's

it would have acquitted him despite the fact that

the bar was not technically open to the public because he
would not have had the requisite intent.
Third, even if the jury believed that appellant
entered the bar thinking it was open, his defense becomes
irrelevant· because he - remained inside unlawfully.

See Point

I.
POINT IV
APPELLANT KNOWINGLY AND INTELLIGENTLY
WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT.
In Point V of his brief, appellant contends his
/

confession was not an implied waiver of his right to remain
silent.

Al though appellant admits he understood his "Miranda

rights," he claims he did not waive his right to remain
silent.

Respondent contends that appellant's voluntary
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confession, made when he was aware and knowledgeable of his
rights, was an effective waiver.

-·=-·

The Supreme Court, in Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412
U.S. 218 (1973), looked at the totality of all the surrounding
circumstances to determine that consent to a search was
voluntary.

Thus, the Court considered the defendant's age,

education, intelligence, lack of advice on rights, length of
detention, whether the questioning was repeated and prolonged
and whether physical punishment was used.

The defendant's

.. .,.
,,.

..•.

=-=

maturity and intelligence were factors considered in Frazier
v • Cu pp , 3 9 4 U. S • 7 31 ( 19 6 9 ) •

This Court, 1n State v. Allen, 29 Utah 2d 88, 505
P.2d 302 (1973), thought the question of whether a statement
was voluntary should be determined from all the evidence

.....

produced by both sides.
In this case, the only evidence to support
appellant's contention is that appellant, before he spoke, did

·-··

not expressly say that he wished to freely speak (T. 90).
Justice Powell, in Garner v. U.S., 424 U.S. 648 (1976), felt
that it was relevant that the defendant in that case failed to
claim the privilege of silence.
In considering the totality of the circumstances,
the evidence supports respondent's contention that the waiver
was voluntary.
deficiencies.

At trial, appellant displayed no educational
He was a mature adult (T. 99), of presumably
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·,_··

normal intelligence.

He,

in fact, was capable of working as a

skilled craftsman--a carpenter (T. 99).
English.

He spoke fluent

He did not confess under duress after lengthy

questioning.

In fact,

question (T. 90).

he answered Officer Semken's first

He had a prior felony conviction and thus

was no novice in these matters.

When appellant was thirsty,

the officer supplied him with soft drinks (T. 92).

The

circumstances surrounding appellant's confession present no
suggestion that the confession was coerced.
In State v. Moraine, 25 Utah 2d 51, 475 P.2d 831,
832 (1970),
himself.

the defendant robbed a store and accidentally shot

When the police found him, he was in great pain.

The officer read him his rights and the defendant said he did
not wish to talk.
the robbery.

Then the officer asked him why he committed

The defendant's incriminating answer was

admitted into evidence although he claimed the state failed to
•(

affirmatively show that he waived his right to remain silent.
This Court stated:
The fact that he made the statement after
being warned is a clear indication that he
waived any right, if any he had, to remain
si1ent.
/
Respondent contends the present case clearly comes
within the scope of Moraine, supra.

In that case, the

defendant was in great pain and had expressly said he did not
-19-
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w is h to talk .

In this case, the defendant was not suffering

from any mental or physical pain and had expressed no desire
to remain silent.

His confession was free and voluntary, made

under ideal circumstances.
United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 188
(1977) concerned a defendant making a similar claim.

Chief

Justice Burger, in writing for the Court, statea:
Inaeed, it seems self-evident that one who
is told he is free to ref use to answer
questions is in a curious posture to later
complain that his answers were compelled.
In State v. Winkle, Utah, 535 P.2d 82, 83 (1975), an
issue was whether the defendant voluntarily waived his rights.
This Court statea:
The question thus posed is whether the
defenaant, in awareness of his rights, and
in circumstances where he was free to
choose, knowingly and voluntarily waived
his right to remain silent and to have
counsel.
It is both the prerogative and
the
ty of the trial court to make that
determination (emphasis added).

du

1

In this case the court, after hearing Officer Semken's
testimony on the circumstances surrounding the confession,
decided the confession was aarnissible because the appellant
had waived his right to remain silent.

The trial court was in

the best position to view the facts and

aeter~ine

appellant's confession was voluntary.

that

The evidence, viewed as
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a whole, supports the trial court's view that appellant
understood his rights and knowingly waived the right to remain
silent.

Since appellant has failed to show that the trial

court abused its discretion, the finding of waiver should be
upheld.

State v. Ashdown, 5 Utah 2d 59, 296 P.2d 726 (1956);

State v. Meinhart, Utah, 617 P.2d 355 (1980).
Respondent contends that even if the confession
should have been suppressed, its admission into evidence was
not harmful error.

The evidence presented at trial, in

addition to appellant's confession, was sufficient to sustain
the conviction.

Appellant was caught exiting through the

bar's back door (T. 26).

The burglary proceeds were in

appellant's control (T. 31).

The appellant told the police

they would not find fingerprints (T. 51), a fact which
certainly infers guilty knowledge.
owner why he

had~committed

don't know.

I'm sorry.

trash can"

(T. 61).

When asked by the bar

the crime, appellant stated "I

But everything you own is in this

With this evidence of guilt, appellant's

confession was unnecessary to sustain his conviction.
Cottrell v. State, 458 P.2d 328 (Okla. Cir. 1969); State v.
/

Ayers, 518 P.2d 190 (Oregon 1973).
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POINT V

THE CONTENTS OF A TRASH BUCKET WERE
PROPERLY ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE.
In Point IV of his brief, appellant claims that the
contents of a trash can should not have been admitted into
evidence for two reasons.

First, that the officer failed to

testify that the contents of the can were in the same
condition as at the time the offense occurred.

Second, that

the contents should have been individually identified.
Respondent contends that the contents of the trash
bucket were properly admitted and that appellant's contentions
are without merit.
In this case, the contents of the trash bucket were
introduced into evidence to show appellant's intent and to
allow

~n

inference of his unlawful entry or remaining.

Whether a few coins were missing or added is immaterial
because the evidence was not introduced to prove the exact
contents of the trash bucket.

If appellant was charged with theft instead of
burglary, the exact value of the can's contents would be
/

important because it would determine the
under Utah Code Ann., § 76-6-412.

~egree

of the offense

Appellant was charged with

burglary, for which the offense and sentence remains the same
regardless of how much was taken.
-22-
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Although it would not matter in this case if the
evidence was not exactly as it was at the time of the crime,
appellant contends that the state had to meet the test set
forth in Carter v. State, 446 P.2d 165 (Nevada 1968).

That

Court required that the evidence be identical and in the same
condition.

This Court has set its own standard which differs

from the Nevada test.
In State v. Madsen, 28 Utah 2d 108, 498 P.2d 670,
672 (1972), this Court held that to be admissible in evidence,
an object must be shown to be "in substantially the same
condition as at the time of a crime."

In determining whether

evidence is admissible, this Court considers the circumstances
of preservation and custody of the item and the possibility of
tampering occurring.
If after consideration of these
factors the trial court is satisfied that
the article or substance has not been
changed or altered, he [sic] may permit
its ititroduction into evidence. While it
is the duty of the court to make the first
determination, the jury may disregard the
evidence shoulo they determine the custody
of the article or substance has not been
sufficiently shown, or that it has been
altered or changed.
The standard set forth in Madsen, supra, was applied
in state v. Eagle Book, Inc., Utah, 583 P.2d 73, 75 (1978).
The witnesses in the case who had purchased the pornography
and submitted it to the county attorney could only testify
-23-
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that the covers on the magazines in question were the same.
They were unable to say whether the magazines' contents were
the same because they had failed to examine the contents at
any time.

This Court, in following Madsen, admitted the

magazines into evidence despite the fact the witnesses could
not say the contents were in the same condition as when
purchased.

This Court stated:
Once in the hands of the County Attorney,
it is generally presumed that the exhibits
were handled with regularity, absent an
affirmative showing of bad faith or actual
tampering. At trial, the exhibits were
identified by the purchasers by the
materials' outer covers and the
purchasers' markings although it could not
unequivocally be said that the material
was identical page for page as when
earlier purchased.
(emphasis added)

In that case, the magazines' contents were extremely important
to the defendant because the offense depended upon whether the
contents were pornographic and thus whether alteration
occurred was relevant.

In the present case, the can's

contents are not that important because the offense of
burglary does not hinge on the amount and value of coins (or
other proceeds) found at the scene.
In Eagle, the evidence was admissible because the
likelihood of tampering was remote and the chain of custody
was established.

In this case, the chain of custody has been

established through the officer's testimony and the likelihood
-24-
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of tampering is remote.

The officer took the can and

contents, made an inventory, and kept the evidence locked up

(T. 31, 32).
the evidence.

Thus, the trial court was correct in admitting
State v. Crook, 565 P.2d 576, 577 (Idaho 1977);

State v. Macumber, 582 P.2d 162 (Arizona 1978); People v.
Roybal, 609 P.2d 1110 (Colo. App. 1979).
In this case the chain of custody was established.
Even when the chain is defective, it affects the weight, not
the admissibility of the evidence.

State v. Carney, 533 P.2d

1268 (Kansas 1975).

Appellant also claims that each item in the waste
can should have been initialed to insure that the inventory
list corresponded with the exhibit at trial.
procedure is impractical and unnecessary.

However, this

At trial, the

custodial officer testified that the exhibit was the same
trash can with the same contents that he found at the scene of
·/

the crime (T. 34).

"This is everything that I

sealed and marked as evidence" {T. 34).
(T.

34).

found and

"It's all in there"

In viewing the testimony, it appears that the

contents of the can remained the same.

Appellant has failed

to support his bald assertion that the contents might be
different, nor has he shown what harm he would have suffered
if the contents were somewhat different.
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It is not necessary to mark each individual coin,
even in a theft case where the exact amount is important to
determine the charge.

State v. McGonigle, 440 P.2d 100

(Arizona 1968); State v. Whittenback, Utah, 621 P.2d 103
(1980).

Marking each coin would serve no useful purpose.

In

this case, the inventory was made to insure that the bar owner
received the stolen money after appellant's trial was over.
Merely totaling the amount of coins was adequate to serve that
purpose.
In addition to the bucket and contents, appellant's
confession, the police officer's and bar

~wner's

testimony,

and the inventory list, all showed that the proceeds of the
burglary were still on the premises when appellant was
arrested.

This evidence--and not the exact or unaltered

amount taken--was sufficient to allow the jury to infer
appellant's intent to commit a theft in the BEJO.

The

admission of the bucket and its contents merely confirmed the
testimony of the presence of the bucket at the scene, allowing
the inference of intent, and was not intended to prove the
contents of the bucket.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, respondent contends that appellant's
rights were not prejudiced by the amendment to the
information; that the jury instruction defining burglary in
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statutory terms was proper; that appellant's requested jury
instruction was correctly refused; that appellant waived his
right to remain silent; and that the bucket and its contents
were admissible because the chain of custody was established.
Since appellant's contentions are without merit, the
conviction and sentence should be af firmea.

Respectfully submitted this

~day

of Julv,

19 82.
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